回顾谷歌18年（ Ian Hickson ）

文章主要是一位在谷歌工作了18年的员工对公司文化变迁的回顾与反思。他从入职、见证公司上市的早期阶段开始，回顾了公司的历程。他提到，初期的谷歌，无论是初级工程师还是最高管理层，都是一群真诚的人，他们都想做正确的事情。然而，随着时间的推移，他发现公司的文化发生了改变，决策从为用户的利益着想，转变成为谷歌的利益着想，再变成为决策者的利益着想，公司的决策也不再透明。

文章作者认为，谷歌文化的恶化最终将不可逆转，因为能起到模范带头作用的人，正是那些愿意打破常规的人。但他也认为，现在治愈谷歌绝对还不晚，这需要对公司高层进行改革，将权力中心从首席财务官办公室转移回那些对有志于谷歌运用的广泛资源为用户创造价值的人手中。

对IT公司的启示：

公司文化是公司的核心竞争力，需要长期坚持和维护。一旦文化出现问题，可能会对公司的长期发展造成严重影响。公司的决策应该以用户和长期价值为导向，而不是短期的利润或者决策者的个人利益。为员工提供一个开放、透明、尊重个人的工作环境，可以激发员工的创新精神和工作激情，从而提高公司的整体竞争力。高层的领导力对公司的发展至关重要，他们的决策和行为将深深影响公司的文化和价值观。

其中Flutter 开发，也是非常类似我们部门，其实一切都是有代价的，规范性的文档和测试必然带来不够快速，但是这些肯定能带来长期的好处，所以还是要看产品的长久性。

原文地址：https://ln.hixie.ch/?start=1700627373&count=1

详细如下：

I joined Google in October 2005, and handed in my resignation 18 years later. Last week was my last week at Google.

我于 2005 年 10 月加入 Google，并在 18 年后递交了辞呈。上周是我在谷歌的最后一周。

I feel very lucky to have experienced the early post-IPO Google; unlike most companies, and contrary to the popular narrative, Googlers, from the junior engineer all the way to the C-suite, were genuinely good people who cared very much about doing the right thing. The oft-mocked "dont be evil" truly was the guiding principle of the company at the time (largely a reaction to contemporaries like Microsoft whose operating procedures put profits far above the best interests of customers and humanity as a whole).

我感到非常幸运，能够经历谷歌IPO后的早期;与大多数公司不同，与流行的说法相反，谷歌员工，从初级工程师一直到最高管理层，都是真正的好人，他们非常关心做正确的事情。经常被嘲笑的“不要作恶”确实是当时公司的指导原则（主要是对像Microsoft这样的同时代人的反应，他们的操作程序将利润远远置于客户和整个人类的最佳利益之上）。

Many times I saw Google criticised for actions that were sincerely intended to be good for society. Google Books, for example. Much of the criticism Google received around Chrome and Search, especially around supposed conflicts of interest with Ads, was way off base (its surprising how often coincidences and mistakes can appear malicious). I often saw privacy advocates argue against Google proposals in ways that were net harmful to users. Some of these fights have had lasting effects on the world at large; one of the most annoying is the prevalence of pointless cookie warnings we have to wade through today. I found it quite frustrating how teams would be legitimately actively pursuing ideas that would be good for the world, without prioritising short-term Google interests, only to be met with cynicism in the court of public opinion.

很多时候，我看到谷歌因为真诚地为社会造福的行为而受到批评。例如，Google Books。谷歌在Chrome和搜索方面受到的大部分批评，尤其是与广告的利益冲突，都是偏离基础的（令人惊讶的是，巧合和错误经常出现恶意）。我经常看到隐私倡导者以对用户有害的方式反对谷歌的提议。其中一些战斗对整个世界产生了持久的影响;最烦人的是我们今天必须涉足的毫无意义的cookie警告的普遍存在。我发现团队如何合法地积极追求对世界有益的想法，而不优先考虑谷歌的短期利益，却在公众舆论场上遭到冷嘲热讽，这让我感到非常沮丧。

Charlies patio at Google, 2011. Image has been manipulated to remove individuals.

2011年，查理在谷歌的露台。图像已纵以删除个人。

Early Google was also an excellent place to work. Executives gave frank answers on a weekly basis, or were candid about their inability to do so (e.g. for legal reasons or because some topic was too sensitive to discuss broadly). Eric Schmidt regularly walked the whole company through the discussions of the board. The successes and failures of various products were presented more or less objectively, with successes celebrated and failures examined critically with an eye to learning lessons rather than assigning blame. The company had a vision, and deviations from that vision were explained. Having experienced Dilbert-level management during my internship at Netscape five years earlier, the uniform competence of people at Google was very refreshing.

早期的谷歌也是一个极好的工作场所。高管们每周都会给出坦率的答案，或者坦率地表示他们无法这样做（例如，出于法律原因或因为某些话题过于敏感而无法广泛讨论）。埃里克·施密特（Eric Schmidt）定期带领整个公司完成董事会的讨论。各种产品的成功和失败或多或少被客观地呈现出来，庆祝成功，批判性地审视失败，着眼于吸取教训而不是归咎于责任。该公司有一个愿景，并解释了与该愿景的偏差。五年前，我在 Netscape 实习期间经历了 Dilbert 级别的管理，Google 员工的统一能力非常令人耳目一新。

For my first nine years at Google I worked on HTML and related standards. My mandate was to do the best thing for the web, as whatever was good for the web would be good for Google (I was explicitly told to ignore Googles interests). This was a continuation of the work I started while at Opera Software. Google was an excellent host for this effort. My team was nominally the open source team at Google, but I was entirely autonomous (for which I owe thanks to Chris DiBona). Most of my work was done on a laptop from random buildings on Googles campus; entire years went by where I didnt use my assigned desk.

在 Google 的前九年里，我从事 HTML 和相关标准方面的工作。我的任务是为网络做最好的事情，因为任何对网络有益的事情都会对谷歌有好处（我被明确告知要忽略谷歌的利益）。这是我在Opera Software工作时开始的工作的延续。谷歌是这项工作的优秀东道主。我的团队名义上是谷歌的开源团队，但我是完全自主的（我要感谢Chris DiBona）。我的大部分工作都是在谷歌园区随机建筑物的笔记本电脑上完成的;整整几年过去了，我没有使用分配的办公桌。

In time, exceptions to Googles cultural strengths developed. For example, as much as I enjoyed Vic Gundotras enthusiasm (and his initial vision for Google+, which again was quite well defined and, if not necessarily uniformly appreciated, at least unambiguous), I felt less confident in his ability to give clear answers when things were not going as well as hoped. He also started introducing silos to Google (e.g. locking down certain buildings to just the Google+ team), a distinct departure from the complete internal transparency of early Google. Another example is the Android team (originally an acquisition), who never really fully acclimated to Googles culture. Androids work/life balance was unhealthy, the team was not as transparent as older parts of Google, and the team focused on chasing the competition more than solving real problems for users.

随着时间的流逝，谷歌文化优势的例外情况也随之出现。例如，尽管我很喜欢维克·贡多特拉（Vic Gundotra）的热情（以及他对Google+的最初愿景，这同样是相当明确的，即使不一定得到一致的赞赏，至少是明确的），但我对他的能力感到不太有信心，当事情进展不如希望的那样顺利时，他会给出明确的答案。他还开始向谷歌引入孤岛（例如，将某些建筑物锁定在Google+团队中），这与早期谷歌完全内部透明截然不同。另一个例子是 Android 团队（最初是收购的），他们从未真正完全适应谷歌的文化。Android 的工作/生活平衡不健康，团队不像 Google 的旧部分那样透明，团队更专注于追逐竞争对手，而不是为用户解决实际问题。

My last nine years were spent on Flutter. Some of my fondest memories of my time at Google are of the early days of this effort. Flutter was one of the last projects to come out of the old Google, part of a stable of ambitious experiments started by Larry Page shortly before the creation of Alphabet. We essentially operated like a startup, discovering

what we were building more than designing it. The Flutter team was very much built out of the culture of young Google; for example we prioritised internal transparency, work/life balance, and data-driven decision making (greatly helped by Tao Dong and his UXR team). We were radically open from the beginning, which made it easy for us to build a healthy open source project around the effort as well. Flutter was also very lucky to have excellent leadership throughout the years, such as Adam Barth as founding tech lead, Tim Sneath as PM, and Todd Volkert as engineering manager.

我最后的九年时间是在 Flutter 上度过的。我在谷歌工作期间最美好的回忆是这项工作的早期。Flutter 是旧 Google 推出的最后一个项目之一，是 Larry Page 在 Alphabet 创建前不久开始的一系列雄心勃勃的实验的一部分。我们基本上像一家初创公司一样运作，发现我们正在构建的东西比设计它更重要。Flutter 团队很大程度上是建立在年轻的 Google 文化之上的;例如，我们优先考虑内部透明度、工作/生活平衡和数据驱动的决策（这得到了 Tao Dong 和他的 UXR 团队的大力帮助）。我们从一开始就完全开放，这让我们很容易围绕这项工作构建一个健康的开源项目。Flutter 也非常幸运，多年来一直拥有出色的领导能力，例如 Adam Barth 担任创始技术负责人，Tim Sneath 担任 PM，Todd Volkert 担任工程经理。

We also didnt follow engineering best practices for the first few years. For example we wrote no tests and had precious little documentation. This whiteboard is what passed for a design doc for the core Widget, RenderObject, and dart:ui layers. This allowed us to move fast at first, but we paid for it later.

在最初的几年里，我们也没有遵循工程最佳实践。例如，我们没有编写任何测试，并且只有很少的文档。这个白板是核心 Widget、RenderObject 和 dart：ui 层的设计文档。这使我们能够在一开始快速行动，但后来我们为此付出了代价。

Flutter grew in a bubble, largely insulated from the changes Google was experiencing at the same time. Googles culture eroded. Decisions went from being made for the benefit of users, to the benefit of Google, to the benefit of whoever was making the decision. Transparency evaporated. Where previously I would eagerly attend every company-wide meeting to learn what was happening, I found myself now able to predict the answers executives would give word for word. Today, I dont know anyone at Google who could explain what Googles vision is. Morale is at an all-time low. If you talk to therapists in the bay area, they will tell you all their Google clients are unhappy with Google.

Flutter 在泡沫中成长，在很大程度上与谷歌同时经历的变化绝缘。谷歌的文化受到了侵蚀。决策从为用户的利益而做出，到为谷歌的利益，再到为做出决定的人的利益。透明度蒸发了。以前，我会迫不及待地参加每一次全公司的会议，以了解正在发生的事情，现在我发现自己能够预测高管们会逐字逐句地给出答案。今天，我不认识谷歌的任何人可以解释谷歌的愿景是什么。士气处于历史最低点。如果你和湾区的治疗师交谈，他们会告诉你，他们所有的谷歌客户都对谷歌不满意。

Then Google had layoffs. The layoffs were an unforced error driven by a short-sighted drive to ensure the stock price would keep growing quarter-to-quarter, instead of following Googles erstwhile strategy of prioritising long-term success even if that led to short-term losses (the very essence of "dont be evil"). The effects of layoffs are insidious. Whereas before people might focus on the user, or at least their company, trusting that doing the right thing will eventually be rewarded even if its not strictly part of their assigned duties, after a layoff people can no longer trust that their company has their back, and they dramatically dial back any risk-taking. Responsibilities are guarded jealously. Knowledge is hoarded, because making oneself irreplaceable is the only lever one has to protect oneself from future layoffs. I see all of this at Google now. The lack of trust in management is reflected by management no longer showing trust in the employees either, in the form of inane corporate policies. In 2004, Googles founders famously told Wall Street "Google is not a conventional company. We do not intend to become one." but that Google is no more.

然后谷歌裁员了。裁员是一个非受迫性错误，出于短视的驱动力，以确保股价保持季度增长，而不是遵循谷歌过去的战略，即使这会导致短期损失，也要优先考虑长期成功（“不要作恶”的本质）。裁员的影响是阴险的。以前人们可能会关注用户，或者至少是他们的公司，相信做正确的事情最终会得到回报，即使这不是他们分配的职责的一部分，但在裁员之后，人们不能再相信他们的公司会支持他们，他们会大大减少任何冒险行为。责任被嫉妒地守卫着。知识是囤积的，因为让自己不可替代是保护自己免受未来裁员的唯一杠杆。我现在在谷歌上看到了这一切。对管理层缺乏信任反映在管理层也不再以愚蠢的公司政策的形式表现出对员工的信任。2004年，谷歌的创始人对华尔街说过一句名言：“谷歌不是一家传统的公司。我们不打算成为其中之一。

Much of these problems with Google today stem from a lack of visionary leadership from Sundar Pichai, and his clear lack of interest in maintaining the cultural norms of early Google. A symptom of this is the spreading contingent of inept middle management. Take Jeanine Banks, for example, who manages the department that somewhat arbitrarily contains (among other things) Flutter, Dart, Go, and Firebase. Her department nominally has a strategy, but I couldnt leak it if I wanted to; I literally could never figure out what any part of it meant, even after years of hearing her describe it. Her understanding of what her teams are doing is minimal at best; she frequently makes requests that are completely incoherent and inapplicable. She treats engineers as commodities in a way that is dehumanising, reassigning people against their will in ways that have no relationship to their skill set. She is completely unable to receive constructive feedback (as in, she literally doesnt even acknowledge it). I hear other teams (who have leaders more politically savvy than I) have learned how to "handle" her to keep her off their backs, feeding her just the right information at the right time. Having seen Google at its best, I find this new reality depressing.

如今，谷歌的这些问题很大程度上源于桑达尔·皮查伊（Sundar Pichai）缺乏远见卓识的领导，以及他对维护早期谷歌文化规范明显缺乏兴趣。其症状是无能的中层管理人员队伍的蔓延。以珍妮·班克斯（Jeanine Banks）为例，她管理的部门有点随意地包含（除其他外）Flutter、Dart、Go和Firebase。她的部门名义上有一个战略，但我想泄露就不能泄露;我真的永远无法弄清楚它的任何部分是什么意思，即使多年听她描述它。她对团队所做工作的理解充其量是最低限度的;她经常提出完全不连贯和不适用的要求。她以一种非人性化的方式将工程师视为商品，违背人们的意愿重新分配，与他们的技能无关。她完全无法接受建设性的反馈（例如，她甚至不承认这一点）。我听说其他团队（他们的领导者比我更精通政治）已经学会了如何“处理”她，让她远离他们的支持，在正确的时间向她提供正确的信息。在看到谷歌最好的一面后，我发现这个新的现实令人沮丧。

There are still great people at Google. Ive had the privilege to work with amazing people on the Flutter team such as JaYoung Lee, Kate Lovett, Kevin Chisholm, Zoey Fan, Dan Field, and dozens more (sorry folks, I know I should just name all of you but theres too many!). In recent years I started offering career advice to anyone at Google and through that met many great folks from around the company. Its definitely not too late to heal Google. It would require some shake-up at the top of the company, moving the centre of power from the CFOs office back to someone with a clear long-term vision for how to use Googles extensive resources to deliver value to users. I still believe theres lots of mileage to be had from Googles mission statement (to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful). Someone who wanted to lead Google into the next twenty years, maximising the good to humanity and disregarding the short-term fluctuations in stock price, could channel the skills and passion of Google into truly great achievements.

谷歌仍然有很棒的人。我有幸与 Flutter 团队中出色的人一起工作，例如 JaYoung Lee、Kate Lovett、Kevin Chisholm、Zoey Fan、Dan Field 等等（对不起，伙计们，我知道我应该说出你们所有人的名字，但太多了！近年来，我开始为谷歌的任何人提供职业建议，并借此结识了公司周围的许多优秀人士。现在治愈谷歌绝对还为时不晚。这需要对公司高层进行一些改组，将权力中心从首席财务官办公室转移回对如何利用谷歌的广泛资源为用户提供价值有明确长期愿景的人。我仍然相信，谷歌的使命宣言（组织世界信息并使其普遍可访问和有用）可以带来很多好处。一个想要带领谷歌进入下一个二十年的人，最大限度地造福人类，不顾股价的短期波动，可以将谷歌的技能和热情转化为真正伟大的成就。

I do think the clock is ticking, though. The deterioration of Googles culture will eventually become irreversible, because the kinds of people whom you need to act as moral compass are the same kinds of people who dont join an organisation without a moral compass.

不过，我确实认为时间在流逝。谷歌文化的恶化最终将变得不可逆转，因为你需要充当道德指南针的人，就是那些没有道德指南针就不能加入组织的人。

Google是个非常好的公司，尤其是之前，但是谷歌会变化。工程师文化也必将改变。

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